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Abstract
We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specifically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism
design.
We view information acquisition of and robustness to private information as two distinct but
related aspects of information management important in many design settings. We review the
existing literature and point out directions for additional future work
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3

Introduction

The mechanism design literature of the last thirty years has been a huge success on a number of
di erent levels. There is a beautiful theoretical literature that has shown how a wide range of
institutional design questions can be formally posed as mechanism design problems with a common
structure. We can understand institutions as the solution to a well de ned planner's problem of
achieving some objective or maximizing some utility function subject to incentive constraints. Elegant characterizations of optimal mechanisms have been obtained. Market design has become more
important in many economic arenas, both because of new insights from theory and developments
in information technology. A very successful econometric literature has tested auction theory in
practise.
The basic issue in mechanism design is how to truthfully elicit private and decentralized held
information in order to achieve some private or social objective. The task of the planner is then to
design a game of incomplete information in which the agents have indeed an incentive to reveal the
information. The optimal design of the game will commonly depend on the common prior which
the principal and the agents share about the types of the agents. However, here an unfortunate
disconnect between the general theory and the applications and the empirical work emerges. The
theoretical analysis begins with a given common prior, often over a small set of types, and then
analyzes the optimal mechanism with respect to the given common prior. Yet, the ne details
of the speci ed environment incorporated in the common prior will often not be available to the
designer in practise.
In this survey, we shall pursue two distinct but closely related arguments. The rst part of
this survey is centered on the issue of endogenous information structures in mechanism design.
In traditional mechanism design literature, the set of possible types for the participants in the
design problem is exogenously given. This may be a reasonable approximation in situations such as
determining Pareto e cient allocations in an exchange economy where individual preferences are
private information. It is equally clear that for many applications it is not reasonable to assume
that the relevant information is independent of the mechanism chosen.
To illustrate the point concretely, consider decision making in committees. If committee members have to invest privately in order to come up with useful information for the decision making
process, then it is clear that the eventual decision making process has a impact on the willingness to
invest in such information generation. If this information has little impact on the eventual decision,
there is no point to acquiring it. As a second, slightly di erent application where the participants'
information depends on the mechanism chosen, consider the optimal design of auctions. The auctioneer may have control over pieces of evidence that determine the bidders' valuation for the object
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on sale. Whether it is in the auctioneer's best interest to disclose this information depends on the
properties of the auction to follow.
We view such information acquisition and information disclosure as two di erent aspects of an
information management problem that we believe is important in many mechanism design settings.
In our view, it is important to recognize that in many examples of great practical interest, it is not
accurate to view the distribution of types as independent from the choice of the mechanism. At the
most abstract level, we may think about mechanisms as institutions that coordinate societies on
particular collective choices. As long as the relevant information is produced within the economies,
it should be clear that this production is guided by economic incentives. Hence a good mechanism
ought to provide incentives for e cient collective choices given the information collected, but at
the same time a good mechanism should also provide the participants with good incentives for
producing the relevant information. We review the existing literature on information acquisition
and disclosure in a number of applications. We also point out some directions where we think
fruitful additional work should be carried out.
Second, we shall analyze mechanism design when the principal and the agents have little common knowledge and the type space is large. The starting point here is the in uential formulation
of the robustness question due to Robert Wilson. He emphasized that academic mechanisms designers were tempted to assume too much common knowledge information among the players, and
suggested that more robust conclusions would arise as researchers were able to relax those common knowledge assumptions. Practitioners have often been led to argue in favor of using simpler
but apparently sub-optimal mechanisms. It is argued that the optimal mechanisms are not "robust" - i.e., they are too sensitive to

ne details of the speci ed environment. In response to

the concerns, researchers have developed many attractive and in uential results by imposing (in a
somewhat ad hoc way) stronger solution concepts and/or simpler mechanisms motivated by robust
considerations. A natural theoretical question to ask is whether it is possible to explicitly model the
robustness considerations in such a way that stronger solution concepts and/or simpler mechanisms
are endogenously generated.
To the extent that the agents have or can get access to private information about their own
valuation, the valuation or the beliefs of the others, the concern of the designer for the performance
of the mechanism leads him naturally to adopt robust mechanism. Consequently, in this survey we
shall study mechanism design when we relax both the small and the given type space assumptions.
The remainder of this survey is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic model and
notation for the survey. Section 3 is meant to motivate and emphasize the perspective of this
survey. We shall

rst discuss the role of information acquisition in generalized Vickrey Groves

Clark mechanism and second talk about the role of espionage in rst price auctions. In Section 4
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we survey the role of information management in mechanism design. Section 5 frames the concern
for robust mechanism in terms of the Wilson doctrine and introduces the language of large type
spaces and the related equilibrium notions. Section 6 discusses recent results regarding the robust
mechanisms. It also emphasizes the importance of strategic uncertainty by discussing how classic
auction results are modi ed by the introduction of large type spaces. Section 7 concludes the survey
and discusses a number of open and note worthy research issues.

2

Setup

2.1

Payo

Environment

We consider a

nite set of agents, indexed by i 2 I = f1; :::; Ig. The agents have to make a

collective choice y from a set Y of possible outcomes. The payo
write

2

=

1

I.

type of agent i is

Each agent has utility function ui : Y

i

2

i.

We

! R. An important

special case is the quasi-linear environment where the set of outcomes Y has the product structure
Y = Y0

Y1

YI , where Y1 = Y2 = ::: = YI = R, and a utility function:
ui (y; ) = ui (y0 ; y1 ; :::; yI ; ) , vi (y0 ; ) + yi ;

which is linear in yi for every agent i.
The collective choice problem is represented by a social choice correspondence F :
a social choice function is given by f :

! 2Y nf;g,

! Y . If the true payo type pro le is , the planner

would like the outcome to be an element of F ( ) ; or simply f ( ). This environment is xed and
informally understood to be common knowledge. We allow for interdependent types - one agent's
payo

from a given outcome depends on other agents' payo

private value model if for all ;

0

types. The model is said to be a

:
i

=

0
i

) ui (y; ) = ui y;

0

.

(1)

If condition (1) is violated, then the model displays interdependent values.
The payo type pro le is understood to contain all information that is relevant to whether the
planner achieves his objective or not. It incorporates many classic problems such as the e cient
allocation of an object, the e cient provision of a public good, and arriving at a decision in a
committee.
Much of the recent work on interdependent values has used the solution concept of ex post rather
than Bayesian equilibrium. The analysis of ex post equilibrium is considerably more tractable,
because incentive compatible transfers can frequently be derived with ease and single crossing
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conditions generating incentive compatibility are easy to identify. A conceptual advantage of ex
post equilibrium is its robustness to the informational assumptions about the environment. In
particular, it often seems unrealistic to allow the mechanism to depend on the designer's knowledge
of the type space as Bayesian mechanisms do.1 We shall initially focus on truthtelling in the direct
mechanism and hence for equilibrium it will be su cient to verify ex post incentive compatibility.
De nition 1 A direct mechanism f :

! Y is ex post incentive compatible if, for all i and

ui (f ( ) ; )
0
i

for all

2

ui f

0
i;

;

i

2

,

;

i.

The notion of ex post incentive compatibility requires agent i to prefer truthtelling at

if all

the other agents also report truthfully. In contrast the notion of dominant strategy implementation
requires agent i to prefer truthtelling for all possible reports by the other agents, truthtelling or
not.
De nition 2 A direct mechanism f :
all i and

0

for all

2
2

! Y is dominant strategies incentive compatible if, for

,
ui f

i;

0

i

;

ui f

0

;

;

.

If there are private values (i.e., each ui (y; ) depends on

only through

i ),

then ex post

incentive compatibility is equivalent to dominant strategies incentive compatibility.

2.2

Information Acquisition

In problems of choice under uncertainty, the starting point of the analysis is often the situation
where an agent holds a prior probability distribution on a state of the world ! 2

and must decide

on an optimal action y 2 Y . One way to model information acquisition is then to assume that the
agent has access to a statistical experiment that yields additional information on !: Each outcome
in the experiment results in a posterior belief on
on

by
1

with a generic element

2

: We denote the set of probability distributions

:

Ex post incentive compatibility was discussed as "uniform incentive compatibility" by Holmstrom and Myerson

(1983). Ex post equilibrium is increasingly studied in game theory (see Kalai (2004)) and is often used in mechanism
design as a more robust solution concept (Cremer and McLean (1985)). A recent literature on interdependent value
environments has obtained positive and negative results using this solution concept: Dasgupta and Maskin (2000),
Bergemann and V•
alim•
aki (2002), Perry and Reny (2002), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel, Moldovanu,
Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Zame (2004).
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For the purposes of the current survey, it is easiest to formulate the information acquisition
decision of the agent as a choice amongst a set of distributions on
by

: We index the experiments

2 A and hence an experiment results in distribution F ( ) on

: We also write the utility

function of the agent directly in terms of the posterior and the chosen action u (y; ). Under suitable
regularity conditions, there is an optimal action y ( ) for each . If we denote the cost of observing
experiment

by c ( ) ; the information acquisition problem can be written concisely as follows:
Z
u (y ( ) ; ) dF ( ) c ( ) :
max
2A

To see a concrete example that ts the framework above, consider the case where ! 2 f0; 1g.

Then we may identify

with [0; 1] where

= Prf! = 1g: Let

the agent and consider the following family of experiments:
8
>
for <
>
0)
< (1
F ( )=

Here

1

>
>
:

for

0

1

for

0

indicate the prior distribution of

0;

0

< 1;

= 1:

is the probability of observing a perfectly informative signal on !: It is easy to generate

richer examples of this structure.
When considering the mechanism design problem, all relevant information for the mechanism
is contained in the vector of posteriors ( 1 ; :::;

I) :

It is thus possible to consider the posteriors

directly as the inputs that the mechanism designer elicits from the participants in the mechanism.
The choice of individual experiment
i:

i

determines the appropriate distribution for the posteriors

Since these posteriors are in general multi-dimensional (and quite often in nite dimensional),

it is clear that unless further assumptions on the payo structures are made, the task of designing
mechanisms in such settings is very complicated.
We shall consider throughout the case where the ex ante investment in information is covert.
As a result, the mechanism cannot be written as directly depending on

3

i:

Motivating Examples

3.1

Information Acquisition in Generalized VCG auctions

Our rst example examines the role of information acquisition in a single unit auction with interdependent values. More speci cally, we are interested in the possibility of inducing the bidders to
gather information in a socially e cient manner.
The auction has two bidders, each of whom has statistically independent private information
on a di erent binary aspect ! i 2 f! l ; ! h g of the good. We denote by

i

bidder i's probability
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assessment on the event f! i = ! h g: We assume that the player i's payo from obtaining the object
at price yi take the following linear form:

ui ( ) =
where we assume that

> 0: If

i

+

yi ;

j

(2)

= 0; we are in the private values case. When

= ; we have a

model with pure common values.
Denote the allocation of the object in the auction by y0 2 f1; 2g: E cient allocation requires

that

y0 ( i ;

j)

= i if (

)(

j)

i

> 0:

Hence a necessary condition for incentive compatibility of the e cient allocation is that

:

Under this condition, it is easy to verify that the direct mechanism consisting of
(
( + ) j;
if i
j;
yi ( i ; j ) =
0;
if otherwise,
and
y0 ( i ;

j)

= i if

i

j;

is ex post incentive compatible. This mechanism is called the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism and its analysis in the interdependent values case is due to Dasgupta and Maskin
(2000).
As we have assumed statistical independence across the two bidders' information, the revenue
equivalence theorem implies that the expected payo s of the two bidders in all e cient mechanisms
coincide with the payo s in the generalized VCG mechanism. As we are focusing here on socially
e cient information acquisition, it is natural to ask whether an individual bidder's incentives to
acquire additional information coincide with those of a utilitarian social planner.
Our main nding in Bergemann and V•alim•aki (2002) implies that when

< 0, the generalized

VCG auction gives too low incentives for information acquisition to the individual bidders. If

> 0,

then the individual agents have an incentive to engage in excessive information acquisition.
To see the intuition for this result, notice that the generalized VCG mechanism allocates the
object to i only if

i

j:

ui ( i ;

j)

For

i

j;

ui ( j ;

j)

and hence the gains from higher
i0 s

i

= maxfui ( i ;

j ) ; uj

( i;

j )g

ui ( j ;

j) ;

are the same for bidder i and for the social planner. Bidder

payo is zero in the generalized VCG mechanism for all

i

<

j:

If

> 0 then the utilitarian
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planner's payo is increasing also for
j

i

<

j:

9

Hence the payo to bidder i has a sharper kink at

than the planner's utility function. As a result, bidder i is locally more risk loving than the

planner and hence she has stronger incentives to acquire information. It should be noted that when
= 0; bidder i0 s payo equals the planner's payo as a function of

i

(up to a constant) and as

a result, private incentives for information acquisition coincide with the planner's incentives. The
divergence between the private and the social bene ts to information acquisition in a single unit
auction with interdependent values has rst been observed in Maskin (1992).
Insert Figure 1: Social Gains from Information Here
Insert Figure 2: Private Gains from Information Here
This example shows how e cient use of information is often incompatible with e cient acquisition of information. It is clear that a second best mechanism would sacri ce some of the allocational
e ciency relative to the generalized VCG mechanism in order to achieve better alignment of private
and social incentives in the information acquisition stage. Full exploration of this trade-o remains
an open question at this time.

3.2

Espionage in First-Price Auctions

Our second example demonstrates the importance of modeling information about other players'
types. Consider an independent private value rst price auction between two bidders for a single
object. The valuations are drawn from a common distribution F ( i ) on [0; 1] and this data is
common knowledge at the outset of the game. After observing one's own valuation, the players
may engage in costly espionage. By paying a cost of c > 0; each player may observe the valuation of
the other bidder. After the players have acquired the information, they bid in a rst price auction
We call this game with the added opportunity for information acquisition the modi ed rst price
auction. In a second price auction such an option to acquire additional information would never
be exercised as the bidders have dominant strategies. In a rst price auction, however, the optimal
bids depend on the bids of others and as a result, there may be scope for espionage.
For large c; it is clearly never optimal for any bidder to acquire information about her opponent.
Consider hence the case of a relatively small c: It is clear that a bidder with a low valuation is not
going to engage in espionage as the potential gains from a possibly lower winning bid are outweighed
by the cost of espionage. Consider for the moment the bidder with the highest possible valuation
i

= 1: In the case without espionage, this bidder submits a bid of E [ ] and wins the auction with

probability 1. If it is possible to acquire information about the other bidder's type, this will be
bene cial if
E[

b ( )] > c;
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where b ( ) is the equilibrium bid of the other bidder in the standard rst price auction. When
this condition holds, all equilibria of the modi ed rst price auction game display some information
acquisition.
Such information about the payo

types of the other bidders turns out to have major con-

sequences for the qualitative features of the equilibrium in the game. First of all, it should be
noted that even in the case of a continuous distribution of individual valuations, the equilibria
will typically be in mixed strategies. By the previous reasoning, some types of bidder i do not
acquire information. Suppose these types bid according to a pure strategy. Those types of bidder
j that engage in espionage can then win the auction by matching this bid.2 Furthermore, in rst
price auctions, bi (vi ) < vi for some types of uninformed bidders. As long as bidder j engages in
espionage with a strictly positive probability, the uninformed bidder could increase her probability
of winning by increasing her bid by an arbitrarily small amount.
An immediate consequence of this is that the equilibria in the modi ed rst price auction fail
to be e cient. As the uninformed bidders are randomizing, it is a positive probability occurrence
that a bidder with a lower valuation for the object wins the auction. In the second part of this
survey, we examine the implications of information about the other players' types more generally
in mechanism design problems.

4

Information Management

4.1

Information Acquisition in Committees

We start our survey of recent contributions to the literature on information acquisition with the
problem of optimal committee design when information is costly to acquire. Most papers in this
area have assumed that the agents share a common objective function and also the role of monetary
transfers has been disregarded. As a result, the mechanism design problem of eliciting information
from the agents is probably at its easiest in this particular context and therefore it is easier to
see what additional insights costly information acquisition brings into the model. The committee
members are assumed to have common objectives or to form a team in the sense of Marschak and
Radner (1972)
For concreteness and also in order to conform with most of the papers in the area, we phrase
our discussion of the model in terms of a jury problem. The celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem
(see e.g. Black (1958)) states in its traditional form that decision making in juries under majority
rule outperforms decision making by any single individual. The underlying idea is that in majority
2

We are assuming here that all ties are broken in favor of the bidder with the higher type.
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decisions, the information of several jury members is aggregated in and therefore such decisions are
superior to those arrived at by any individual jury member.
The jury chooses between two alternatives: y0 2 f0; 1g where 0 stands for acquitting the

defendant and 1 stands for convicting the defendant. At the trial, there is uncertainty regarding
the possible guilt of the defendant. We model this by a binary state

2 f0; 1g where 0 stands for

innocence and 1 indicates guilt and for simplicity we assume that the prior probability satis es:
Prf = 1g = 21 : All jury members are assumed to have the same payo functions u (y0 ; ) satisfying:
u (y0 ; ) = 0 if y0 = ;
u (0; 1) =

d0 ;

u (1; 0) =

d1 :

In other words, convicting guilty and acquiring innocent defendants is costless. The costs of wrongful conviction is d1 and the cost of wrongful acquittal is d0 :
At the trial, jury members are presented with evidence on the guilt of the defendant. This is
modeled signal si observed by juror i. We assume that the signals are binary, i.e. si 2 f0; 1g and
correlated with truth in the sense that Prfsi = 0 j = 0 g = p >

1
2

and Prfsi = 1 j = 1 g = q > 21 :

Furthermore, we assume that the signals are independent across the jurors conditional on the state

: Decisions in the jury are arrived at using a jury decision rule. When decisions are arrived at
through a vote, jury members vote by choosing vi : Si ! [0; 1]; where vi (si ) is understood to be
the probability of voting to convict after observing signal si : The jury decision is then simply
y0 : f0; 1gI ! [0; 1];
where y0 (v) gives the probability of convicting given vote pro le v:
The logic behind the Condorcet Jury Theorem runs as follows. If the jury members vote on the
guilt or innocence of the defendant based on their private signal, then the vote counts provide a
better signal of

than the individual si : The problem with this argument is that as pointed out by

Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), it is in general not in the interest of an individual juror to vote
in accordance with their private signal. When the voting stage in the jury is seen as a Bayesian
game, sincere voting, i.e. vi (0) = 0; vi (1) = 1 for all i is not a Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
The reason for this is that at the moment of casting their votes, each jury member must condition
her beliefs about the innocence of the defendant on the event that her own vote is pivotal. This
implies that the other jury members' votes are split equally. If p > q; equal split together with
sincere voting implies that

= 1 is much more likely that

= 0 and as a result, the individual juror

has an incentive to discard her own information. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) compare the
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expected equilibrium payo from di erent voting rules ranging from simple majority to unanimity
as a function of the cost parameters d0 and d1 . By concentrating on symmetric equilibria where
the individual jurors' strategies are responsive to private signals, they show that a wide range of
rules can be optimal.
To see how costly information acquisition changes the situation, Persico (2004) considers a
simple modi cation to the jury problem above. The signal of each jury member is observed only
with cost c > 0: This cost is assumed to be private and as a result, a discrepancy between social
and private incentives for acquiring information arises.3 While Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)
obtain the result that the expected payo from jury decisions increases in the number of members
on the jury, Persico (2004) concludes that optimal jury size is bounded even if the private costs of
information acquisition are not accounted for in the social welfare calculation. The reason for the
di erence in the results depends on the fact that information acquisition by the jurors brings in a
degree of moral hazard into the decision making process. In order for the jurors to be willing to pay
for information, their probability of being pivotal must remain non-negligible. This is only possible
in juries of bounded size. Perhaps more interestingly, Persico (2004) nds that the optimal voting
rule is independent of d0 and d1 and depends rather on the statistical nature of evidence, i.e. on
p and q: For the special case where p = q; he shows that for small c; the optimal supermajority in
the jury decisions converges to p:
A second remarkable property of jury design under costly information acquisition is that the
voting rule is e cient given the information acquired by the jury members. In the setting of
Persico (2004), this property arises partially from the fact that the analysis focuses on pure strategy
equilibria. Under this restriction, any suboptimal decision rule would imply that some agents do
not acquire information. It is not clear that this would remain true if mixed strategies are allowed
in the process of information acquisition. Mukhopadhaya (2003) concentrates on the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium and shows that for a xed voting rule, increasing the jury size may
decrease the accuracy of decisions when information acquisition is costly.
Gershkov and Szentes (2004) consider the optimal method of inducing information acquisition
and eliciting it truthfully from homogenous committee members subject to the requirement that
the decisions must be ex post e cient. In other words, they require that given the information
collected in the committee, the decision must agree with the optimal one. They show that he optimal method for this information gathering is by approaching the committee members sequentially
3

In the literature on jury decisions, the role of monetary transfers has been ignored. This seems to be a reasonable

approximation to most committee decision making processes that are observed in the real world. In addition, Persico
(2004) shows that with monetary transfers the problem of inducing e cient information acquisition can be trivially
solved.
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but withholding the previous record of both who has been approached and what information has
been transmitted. It is also interesting to note that their optimal mechanism features randomized
decisions when decision whether to collect additional information.
In a similar problem, Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz (2005) show that a sequential mechanism
is also optimal in a class of mechanisms that arrive at the correct social decision with probability 1.
Hence in this paper, there is no trade-o between costs of information acquisition and the accuracy
of the decision.
Gerardi and Yariv (2004) remove the restriction on ex post e ciency of the mechanism. They
show that the optimal decision rule is not generally of the type considered in Persico (2004), but
rather it may involve randomizations. In a previous version of the paper, they also showed that
similar results can be obtained in a model where the jury members are allowed to communicate
prior to reporting their information.
The issue of signal accuracy is addressed in Li (2001). In that paper, all jury members invest
in information that is useful for determining the guilt of the defendant. In contrast to the other
papers surveyed here, Li assumes that the signals are publicly observable. As a result his model is
very close to traditional free-riding models of informational externalities. He shows that in order to
provide good incentives for information acquisition, it may be optimal to distort the rule mapping
signals to decisions. To our knowledge, the choice of information precision when information is
privately observed remains an open question. In the notation of the current section, one could e.g.
assume that there is a cost of increasing the accuracy of the signal c (p; q) that is increasing in its
both arguments. If this function is convex, the optimal mechanism would balance the advantages
of acquiring a little information at a low marginal cost with the associated free riding costs from
distributing the task of information acquisition.
Finally, Cai (2003) considers the optimal size of a committee under a xed decision rule in a
committee when the members have heterogenous payo functions. If individual committee members
have preferences di erent from those of the designer of the committee, they have an incentive to
distort their reports to the designer. The main observation of the paper is that preference diversity
may increase the individual members' incentives for acquiring information. As a result, the optimal
size of committees may be higher under preference diversity as the free rider problems are alleviated.
To summarize, the papers reviewed in this section demonstrate in a simple setting how mechanism design problems must be modi ed in order to take into account the costs of getting informed.
When jury members have the same objectives, but bear the cost of information acquisition privately,
free riding becomes an issue in models where information acquisition decisions are not observable.
If it is possible to commit to decision rules at the start of the game, free riding can be fought
to some extent by an appropriate choice of the decision rule. Sometimes this may involve taking
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decisions that are suboptimal in light of the collected information. Even when restricted to ex post
optimal decision rules, the design of an appropriate extensive form for eliciting information from
the jury members provides insights into the general problem.

4.2

Information Acquisition in Auctions

Within the eld of mechanism design, auction theory has seen the largest number of contributions
in the last decade. Surprisingly few of those papers have focussed explicitly on costly information
acquisition. This is somewhat puzzling given the close connections between auctions and price
formation processes in competitive markets. Milgrom (1981) explores the issue of information
acquisition in a model similar to the one presented in the motivating example. His main concern
is on determining whether the model can be used in providing foundations for the fully revealing
rational expectations equilibrium. The connections to the rational expectations equilibrium have
been since worked on extensively but the issue of information acquisition has received a lot less
attention. In our view, the questions relating to socially optimal information acquisition remain
open for a large class of auctions models.
Early contributions to the literature compared the revenue generation across di erent auction
formats, most notably between rst and second price auctions. Matthews (1977) and Matthews
(1984) obtained the result that the two formats lead to the same expected revenue in a special case
of an a liated model. This result is also later found in a sequence of papers on the independent
private information case. These include Hausch and Li (1991), Tan (1992) and Stegeman (1996).
The most direct way of seeing why private values settings lead to same revenue rankings for di erent
auction formats is to observe that by the revenue equivalence theorem, they are equivalent to the
Vickrey auction. Hence the ex ante incentives for investing in information (or even to make more
general investments) must be the same. Rogerson (1992) makes this point in a more general
mechanism design setting than the current auctions model.
If the auction designer has a utilitarian welfare objective, it is again easy to see that the agents
have the correct incentives to acquire information in a socially optimal manner. In the Vickrey
auction, individual payo s, when viewed as functions of own type only, coincide with the sum of
payo s to all players (up to the addition of a constant). As a result, individual incentives coincide
with those of the planner.
Information acquisition in an auction has also been modelled as an auction with costly entry.
Johnson (1979), French and McCormick (1984), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Levin and Smith
(1994) formulate entry as model in which potential bidders do not possess private information until
the incur an entry cost. Upon incurring the cost, they then acquire a private signal about the value
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of the object.
In a more general model of a liated values, Persico (2000) shows that the incentives for information acquisition are di erent in general across di erent auction formats. In particular, he shows
that the marginal incentives for acquiring additional information are higher for rst price auctions
than for second price auctions. This may overturn the general superiority of second price auctions
as demonstrated in Milgrom and Weber (1982). In a model with a liated values, additional information allows more accurate predictions of other players' bids. As the transfers in a rst price
auction depend on own bids, it is important to obtain such information in order to be able to shade
own bids optimally.
In Bergemann and V•alim•aki (2002), we consider the possibility of maintaining the utilitarian
optimal allocation in a model of interdependent but statistically independent valuations. Each
bidder i acquires information on ! i and this information is independent across the bidders. As
explained above, we can view the information acquisition decision as a choice of distributions over
the posterior beliefs

ii

on

i:

The utilitarian planner would like to allocate the object to bidder i

such that
ui ( )

uj ( ) for all j 2 f1; :::; Ig:

As explained in the motivating example, this can be done using the generalized VCG mechanism
when the utility functions satisfy the single crossing property:
@ui ( )
@ i

@uj ( )
for all i; j 2 f1; :::; Ig:
@ i

Our main nding in Bergemann and V•alim•aki (2002) is that if uj ( i ;

i)

is decreasing in

i

for all j 6= i; then the VCG auction gives too low incentives for information acquisition to the
individual bidders. If uj ( i ;

i)

is increasing in

i

for all j 6= i, then the individual agents have an

incentive to engage in excessive information acquisition.

It should be pointed out that this result does not guarantee that all the equilibria of the information acquisition game between the individual bidders feature excessive information acquisition
in the case where ui ( ) is increasing in

j:

It is simply a local comparison of individual and social

incentives for information acquisition. As such, it is shows that utilitarian optimum is not achievable, but it does not tell de nitively whether equilibrium information acquisition is excessive or
not.
In any case, it is clear that the best mechanisms must trade o

losses at the information

acquisition stage and losses at the allocation stage. In Bergemann, Shi, and V•alim•aki (2005), we
verify that in a model with binary information acquisition decisions equilibria of the information
acquisition game feature excessive information acquisition when ui ( ) is increasing in

j:

There we
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consider the case when the payo s take a simple quasilinear form
ui (y; ) =
If

i

+

= 1; we are in a private values case. When

1
I

1

X

j

+ yi :

(3)

j6=i

= I1 ; we have a model with pure common values.

In this case, the necessary and su cient condition for Bayesian implementability of the e cient
allocation is that
1
:
I
In the symmetric environment de ned by (2), it is clear that e cient allocation of the object
requires that:
j

>

i

) y0 6= i.

In other words, the object is allocated to one of the bidders with the highest type (either realized
or expected).
Incentive compatibility then requires that yi is constant in

i

for all announcements that induce

the same allocation of the object. The allocation changes only at points where two (or more)
bidders have the same type and at these points, incentive compatibility requires that all types
make a zero surplus. In order to compute the generalized VCG transfers denote by

i

the highest

type of bidders other than i: The transfers are then given by
8
X
1
>
<
j , if
i
j for all j 2 f1; :::; Ig;
i
I 1
j6=i
yi ( ) =
>
:
0,
if
otherwise

We contrast the optimal decisions of a planner that acquires the information for the agents with

an equilibrium solution where each agent bears the cost of information acquisition privately. Denote
by cm the highest cost of information acquisition that is compatible with the planner acquiring the
information for m agents. Similarly, denote the cost threshold in the equilibrium problem by b
cm :
We show that:

1. there is excessive information acquisition in equilibrium: b
cm
2. the di erence b
cm
3. the di erence b
cm

cm :

cm is decreasing in .
cm is decreasing in I.

These results generalize also to auctions where multiple units are sold. As explained above, in

the case that

= 1; we have b
cm = cm . Consider next the case where I is large. For all c > 0;

the number of bidders that acquire information is bounded from above by

1
c:

As this bound is
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independent of I; it is clear that the common component in the bidders' utility functions converges
to (1

) E : Hence for large I; the model reduces essentially to the private values model and the

equilibrium information acquisition coincides with the e cient level.

4.3

Dynamic Auctions

Section 4.2 dealt with static mechanisms where the information acquisition decision is taken prior
to executing the mechanism. In dynamic auctions such as the ascending price auction, information
about the valuations of the opponents is disclosed as the mechanism is run. As a result, the timing
of information acquisition becomes a key consideration for the bidders in such auctions. One of the
main insights of the papers reviewed in this section is that the dynamic auction formats may make
it easier to arrive at socially optimal decisions and they may also generate higher revenues to the
seller than their static counterparts.
Compte and Jehiel (2000) compare the performance of a second price sealed bid auction and
an ascending price auction in the presence of information acquisition. They consider a private
value environment in which all but one agent are privately informed about the value, but the nal
bidder has to pay a cost to acquire and assess his valuation for the object. The ascending auction
then provides the uninformed bidder with an option to acquire information should the chances
of winning as expressed by bidding and drop-out behavior of the competitor be reasonably good.
They show that the ascending price auction generates a higher expected welfare than the sealed
bid auction. If the number of bidders is su ciently large, then the ascending price auction also
increases the expected revenue for the seller. The bene cial e ect of an ascending price auction
on the informational decision is shown in Compte and Jehiel (2001) to extend to the case of many
agents who would like to acquire information and to multiple objects. Compte and Jehiel (2004)
use the fact that the ascending price auction o ers the uninformed bidder an option value to show
that if some additional information is likely to arrive in the future, then the uninformed bidder will
stay in the auction even when the price has reached her expected valuation.4
The cost of acquiring information can be viewed as a speci c transaction cost. Motivated by
the experimental results in Lucking-Reiley (1999), Carare and Rothkopf (2001) consider the role of
transaction costs in a slow Dutch auction. The Dutch auction is said to be slow as the price declines
at such a rate, that the optimal bidding strategy of every agent is either to take the object at the
current price or return at a later time to make a bid for the lower price. In a simple model with
random arrival of the bidders, each bidder can either bid directly or at a cost return to the auction
4

A complementary literature in theoretical computer science investigates mechanism design when it is costly to

elicit the preference pro le, see e.g. Parkes (2004). This literature emphasizes the role of proxy bidding and the use
of indirect mechanism.
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at a later time when the price has further depreciated. (Of course, the object might have been sold
at the later time already.) Carare and Rothkopf (2001) show that as the cost of returning increases,
the agents bid more aggressively and generate a higher revenue for the seller. This model provides
a possible rationalization of the experimental ndings of Lucking-Reiley (1999) which showed that
slow Dutch auction, despite strategic equivalence, generated higher revenue than the other auction
formats.
We believe that there are theoretical as well as practical reasons to keep investigating information acquisition in dynamic auctions. First of all, while the superiority of ascending price auctions
to second price sealed bid auctions has been demonstrated in some settings, there is nothing to
suggest that other auction formats might not perform even better. Descending price auctions also
induce information disclosure and it seems to us that a combination of these two formats might
perform very well. Second, many bidding processes are inherently dynamic in nature. Bidding in a
takeover contest and negotiating the terms for a business proposal are obvious examples. In both
of these cases, we believe that the dynamic nature re ects actual fact nding about the proposed
outcomes in addition to taking strategic positions based on the information currently at hand.

4.4

Information Disclosure in Auctions

Up to this point our discussion of auctions has focussed on the case where bidder i can obtain
an additional signal si on

i:

In the previous section, we allowed for the possibility of learning

about other bidders' valuations during the auction. In some circumstances, it is natural to consider
also the case where other players may provide additional information to a bidder. In this section,
we concentrate on the case where the auctioneer has access to signals that she may reveal to the
bidders. Examples of such information disclosures include allowing the bidders to inspect the object
prior to the auction and providing an independent evaluation of the authenticity of a painting etc.
While the focus in the previous sections was on the case where information is costly to acquire,
a natural starting point for this section is the case where information is free. The reason for this
di erence is that in contrast to the previous setting, it may now be in the best interest of the
auctioneer not to provide the bidders with full information even when there is no charge associated
with this information release. Once the form of optimal information release has been determined,
we can address the question of optimal information production by the auctioneer.
Since the discovery of the `linkage principle' in Milgrom and Weber (1982), a lot of attention
has been devoted to the question of information disclosure by an informed auctioneer. As shown
by Milgrom and Weber, in an a liated values models, it is revenue enhancing for the auctioneer
to disclose information publicly to the participants in a wide range of auction formats.
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In the last few years, the issue of information disclosure in auctions has received a lot of
attention. If the a liated values model is asymmetric in the sense that the public information
a ects the bidders' valuations in a di erential manner, Ganuza (2004) shows that linkage principle
may fail and it may be optimal for the auctioneer to reveal her private information partially.
Furthermore, Perry and Reny (1999) and Foucault and Lovo (2003) show that linkage principle does
not necessarily hold in auctions with multi-dimensional signals. With independent information,
Board (2005) shows that releasing information is in general revenue decreasing for second price
auctions when there are only two bidders.
Starting with Mares and Harstad (2003), more general ways of communicating information to
the bidders have been considered. Mares and Harstad assume that the auctioneer can commit
to revealing the information to only one of the bidders. They give examples where this type of
proprietary disclosure of information dominates public disclosure in terms of generating higher
revenues. They also show that it may be particularly useful for the seller to release the proprietary
information to bidders that are initially disadvantaged.
Information disclosure has also been studied in models with private information. For such
models, the e ects behind the original linkage principle are absent and the incentives for disclosing
information must have a di erent origin. Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001) study a model where
an auctioneer chooses the form of a signal si to show to each bidder i. More speci cally, the
auctioneer chooses a partition Si of

i

and bidder i observes signal si 2 Si with the property that

2 si : The auctioneer does not know the signal realization, but calculates its distribution from

i

her prior distribution on

i:

Once bidders have their information, an optimal auction in the sense

of Myerson (1981) is run. The main result of the paper is that it is in general optimal for the
auctioneer to use asymmetric partitions and not to reveal all information. This is easily seen in a
two-bidder example example where
2

and Prf

i

= 1g =

1
2

i

2 f1; 3g and the prior on

1

is independent of the prior on

for i 2 f1; 2g. By choosing S1 = ff1g; f3gg and S2 = ff1; 3gg and running

the auction where bidder i wins if s1 = f3g and pays 3 and bidder 2 wins if s1 = f1g and pays 2.
The expected revenue from this auction is
information is release or

9
4

5
2

which is more than the optimal revenue of 2 when no

when all information is released.

In Eso and Szentes (2004), a di erent approach to information disclosure is adopted. Rather
than giving the information for free to the potential bidders, the auctioneer sells additional information to possibly privately informed bidders. The starting point for this paper is that bidders
may have some initial private information relating to their valuation for the object. In addition to
this, the auctioneer possesses information that determines the total valuation. To model this, let vi
be a random variable representing the private information of bidder i and let si denote the signal
controlled by the seller. A simpli ed version of Eso and Szentes (2004) assumes that

i

= vi + si
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and furthermore that both si and vi are independent across bidders. The main result of the paper
shows that if si is independent of vi ; then the seller can obtain the same revenue as she could
if the signal realization was observable to her. The mechanism that allows for this is one where
the bidders pay for the right to participate in an auction whose payment and allocation rules are
determined by the initial bids. For the case where vi is degenerate, the result is reminiscent of the
results on optimal entry fees to auctions. Furthermore, it is shown that it is always optimal to sell
the signal si to all bidders. Perhaps the key di erence to the Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001)
model is that Eso and Szentes (2004) allow for mechanisms that are not individually rational for
the bidders at the stage when the auctioneer has released her private information.
The issue of disclosure is of course also relevant in principal-agent models. Lewis and Sappington
(1994) consider an optimal monopoly pricing model with incomplete information. The seller can
choose how much information, which improves their estimate about their taste for the products, to
disclose to the buyers They show that typically the optimal release of information is either not to
release any information or to release the maximal amount of information. In Lewis and Sappington
(1994), the informative signal is private information to the buyer and not observable by the seller.
In contrast, Ottaviani and Prat (2001) show in an a liated value model of monopoly pricing and
public disclosure of the signal, that the principal is always better o by committing to disclose any
a liated signal publicly. This result is an extension of the linkage problem from auction models to
monopoly pricing models.
In an incomplete contract setting with hold up, Lau (2004) identi es the optimal information
structure. She shows that in the trade-o

between ex ante e ciency and ex post e ciency, an

intermediate level of asymmetry is optimal. The optimal information structure is derived in a
trade-o between the information rent and the bargaining disagreement e ect.

4.5

Information in Principal-Agent Models

The role of information acquisition in a principal-agent setting has been investigated in a series of
papers by Cremer and Khalil (1992), Cremer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a) and Cremer, Khalil, and
Rochet (1998b). In Cremer and Khalil (1992), the basic problem is a standard adverse selection
problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown cost as in Baron and Myerson (1982). The new
element is that the agent does not know his type at the moment the contract is o ered. He can learn
his type, say his marginal cost, either before he signs the contract or after he signs the contract. If
he wishes to acquire information before signing the contract, then he has to pay a cost c, whereas
after signing the contract, he will learn his type at zero cost. It is therefore socially ine cient to
acquire the information before the contract is signed. The private bene t for the agent however
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is that he may be able to reject contract o ers which would not be pro table given his marginal
cost structure. In Cremer and Khalil (1992), it is shown that the ability of the agent to acquire
information will decrease the downward distortion in production in the high cost state. The optimal
contract will raise the expected value of the contract, type by type, so that the agent will have no
incentive to acquire the information in equilibrium. Yet, the possibility of acquiring information
alone is su cient to increase his expected value from the contract. The distinction between costly
pre-contract and free post contract information is also central in a recent study by Matthews and
Persico (2005) on the excess refund puzzle. They consider the optimal price and refund policy of
sellers when the potential buyers can either engage in costly research to assess the value of the
object or wait until delivery and inspection of the object. As the return of the object is costly,
the optimal selling policy has to nd a balance between returns and sales. Similar to Cremer and
Khalil (1992), they show that it might be optimal for the seller to o er a refund policy su ciently
generous so as to prevent the buyer in equilibrium to acquire information. The distortion in the
refund policy relative to the socially optimal policy will lead to an excess in refunds.
In a recent contribution, Compte and Jehiel (2002), show that the feature that the principal
does not wish the agent to acquire information before the contract depends on the presence of a
single agent. If on the other hand, the principal faces many agents with unknown cost, then it is
generally optimal for some agents to acquire information before they sign the contract. The idea is
that faced with a choice of agents, it is now optimal to try to identify a low cost agent. The decision
to acquire information before the contract is now of course socially bene cial and the principal can
use competition to lower the surplus of the informed agents.
In Cremer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998b), the decision by the agent to get informed is taken
before the contract is o ered. The reversal in the timing of the decision now introduces strategic
uncertainty for the principal as he does not know whether the agent is informed or not. The resulting
equilibrium is one in which the principal o ers a menu of contract, one which will be chosen by the
informed and one which will be chosen by the uninformed. The two contracts will display partial
pooling, in a sense that for low marginal cost of production, informed and uninformed will produce
the same quantity. For intermediate and high production cost, the informed agent will see more
downward distortions, and relative to standard Baron-Myerson type contract, the production will
be higher respective lower for medium and high cost types. The change in production is schedule
is enacted so as to e ciently generate surplus for the informed agent and give him incentives to
acquire information.
Finally, in Cremer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a), the setting is modi ed by assuming that all
information about the cost structure has to be acquired at some xed cost c. Again, the contract
is designed rst and then the agent has to make an information to acquire information. Again,
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the impact of information acquisition a ects both the production schedule and the rent to the
agent. For su ciently small cost of information acquisition, the optimal contract is the standard
Baron-Myerson contract. As the cost of information acquisition increases, the principal will see a
decrease in the value of the contract. The optimal contract will diminish the distortion for low cost
types, and increase it for high cost types. This is the most e cient way to increase the rent for the
agent so that he has an incentive to acquire the information. If the cost of information increases,
it will be optimal to change the contract so that the agent will receive a rent even so he does not
have any privileged information. As the principal cannot receive the entire surplus, the production
level will be below the ex-ante e cient level. As information is costly, it may not be optimal to
acquire information even from a social point of view. An open issue is then whether the design
of the contract by the principal will lead the agent to take on socially e cient decision regarding
information acquisition or whether it will introduce a systematic distortion in the decision of the
agent.
Creswell (1988) considers a problem in which a contractor must decide whether to accept to
build a house. Before accepting the contract, he spends resources investigating the disutility of
production. Ex post, after he begins work he obtains better information and breaches the contract
if this disutility is too high. The precontractual investigation is therefore productive as it reduces
the probability of breach.
In Lewis and Sappington (1997), the decision to acquire information is embedded in a moral
hazard model. In a procurement setting, the agent has to choose an optimal e ort level which
depends on the state of the world. The agent can acquire information about the state of the world
at some cost. The cost of e ort is observable and can be contracted upon. The principal then o ers
the agent a choice between two contract, one for the informed, the other one for the uninformed.
The contract for the informed agent provides incentives to acquire information by guaranteeing
him more than a dollar for every dollar in cost reduction he achieves in the favorable environment.
It also guarantees him a large amount of cost sharing in the unfavorable environment to overall
compensate him for the cost of information acquisition.
Shavell (1994) combines the study of information acquisition and disclosure in a simple buyerseller setting. The study is motivated by a series of legal cases which highlight the tension between
information acquisition and its return and disclosure (see Kronman (1978) for the legal analysis
of this joint problem). A seller owns a single good which he o ers to competing buyers. The
buyers value the object identically but are uncertain about its true value. The seller can generate
information about the true value of the object, but his cost of doing is private information and
varies across types. The analysis distinguishes between two cases: (i) when information has no
social and when it social value. In the rst case, the object has the same value to all buyers which
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value it higher than the seller, whereas in the second case, the optimal use for (or investment in)
the object by the buyer will depend on its value. In the case of pure common value, it is socially
wasteful to generate information. Yet, with voluntary disclosure, sellers which have a low cost of
producing information will generate the information and disclose the value if it is above a critical
value v and are silent if the true value is below v . The typical unravelling result fails to apply
as sellers with a high cost of generating information will not produce information. In consequence,
the buyer will interpret the silence of a seller as coming from two possible sources, ignorance or low
quality good. But as ignorance is a possibility, due to high cost, the informed seller will be able
to extract a higher value from the object than its true value, conditional on v < v . This provides
the cover for the informed agent and the incentive to generate information. On the other hand,
if information disclosure is mandatory, the seller will follow the e cient policy and always acquire
information at the socially optimal rate, in particular acquire no information in the case of pure
common value.5

4.6

Information and Privacy

A more implicit source of information acquisition arises in repeated interactions with private information. Consider the relationship of a customer with one or more suppliers. If his willingness
5

Since Demski and Sappington (1987) introduced the model of delegated expertise, a growing literature has inves-

tigated the role of information acquisition in the optimal design of organizations. In this survey, we will not cover this
reseach area and merely point the reader to some of the important contributions in this area. In a model of delegated
expertise, as formulated by Demski and Sappington (1987), the agent has to make two decisions:

rst he can acquire

or re ne information about the nature of alternatives, second after receiving the resulting information, he can take an
informed action. In the tradition of the moral hazard literature, the decision to acquire information and the received
signal are unobservable, the resulting action by the agent may or may not be observable.A recent contribution by
Malcolmson (2004) considerably generalizes the model of delegated expertise to a general distribution, a continuum
of signals, actions and outcomes. An interesting variation is introduced in Prendergast (1993). The basic problem for
worker and manager is to estimate the mean of a normal distribution. Yet, the incentive problem becomes di cult
as the worker also observes a noisy signal of the managers observation. He can therefore bias his report about the
signal in the direction of the (estimated) information already held by the manager. In Aghion and Tirole (1997), the
cost of information acquisition determines the structure of an organization. In an incomplete contract model, they
consider the allocation of decision rights among a principal and an agent. The true private and social returns of the
project are unknown and information can be gathered by the agent and the principal. The focus is on the allocation
of the decision right, as it is assumed to be the only instrument and monetary transfers are not used. In Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999), information acquisition determines the structure of the court system In an otherwise similar model
to Aghion and Tirole (1997), the agent can be given monetary incentives based on the nal decision. Finally Gromb
and Martimort (2004) consider the organization of delegated expertise in setting similar to Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999). Yet, in contrast to Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Gromb and Martimort (2004) consider payments on the
basis of the reports of the agents and the eventual outcome of the project.
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to pay for the current transaction provides some information regarding his future purchases, then
the optimal selling policy today may be a ected by considerations about the future value of the
relationship. A series of recent papers analyzes these issues, partly motivated by discussion about
the role of privacy in electronic retailing. Acquisti and Varian (2004) suggest a two period model in
which a single customer purchases repeatedly from a single seller and analyze the optimal pricing
policy of the seller. With forward looking buyer and perfectly correlated willingness to pay across
the two periods the optimal pricing policy is a sequence of static prices, reminiscent of the analysis
of the ratchet e ect (see Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985)). However, if the buyer displays some
myopia, then dynamic pricing, taking into account past purchase decision is optimal even under full
commitment. Taylor (2002) also considers a two period model but with di erent suppliers in every
period. The willingness to pay of the customer is positively, but not perfect correlated, and the
initial supplier can sell the transaction information to future suppliers. The paper considers two
di erent regime regarding the transmission of information, an anonymity and a recognition regime.
In line with the ratchet e ect, it is shown that forward looking buyers prefer the anonymity regime,
but with some myopia, the customer recognition regime and the resulting dynamic pricing may
be preferred by customers and sellers. Calzolari and Pavan (2005) consider a two period model,
in which a single customer interacts sequentially with two di erent sellers. The willingness to pay
by the buyer for each of the two goods is perfectly correlated. The focus of the paper is on the
optimal disclosure policy of the rms, in particular whether the rst rm should be allowed to sell
the transaction information to the second rm. Calzolari and Pavan (2005) show that if the goods
are complements then the optimal disclosure policy is to provide the information, yet if the goods
are substitutes, then optimal information policy is non-disclosure.
In an earlier paper, Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1991) argued that the advantage of privacy
protection conferred by the English auction is one reason why the Vickrey auction is adopted less
frequently in practice than might have been expected from its multitude of theoretical advantages.
If the true valuation of the winning bidder is revealed in the bidding process, this may open the
door for opportunistic behavior by the seller or by third parties. If bidders have such a fear, it may
no longer be in their best interest to bid their valuation in the Vickrey auction. In the English
auction, only the valuation of the losing bidders can be inferred. As the winning bidders maintain
(at least partially) their private information, there is less reason to distort bidding behavior.
The previous discussion focused on the information acquired before contracting. Taylor (2004)
considers a competitive market in which rms post wages, ex ante identical workers apply and
information about the applicants is acquired by the rms after the applications are received. Each
worker can either have a low or a high productivity and the productivity of a worker is identical
across rms. If the rm were to know for sure that a worker has a low productivity, then it would

Information in Mechanism Design August 19, 2005

25

privately and socially bene cial not to hire the worker. The paper then analyzes the equilibrium
incentives to acquire information and compares it to the social e cient incentives. The equilibrium
incentives to acquire diverge from the social incentives depending on whether the additional information is likely to be positive or negative. The competitive market assumption guarantees that
the expected surplus of the contact goes to the worker rather than the rm. The socially e cient
decision compares the expected gains from an informed decision with the expected gains of an uninformed decision which simply equals the expected productivity of the worker. With a competitive
market, the rm pays the worker more than the expected value of the contact. In consequence, its
equilibrium is not the expected productivity but the equilibrium wage. As the equilibrium wage is
larger than the expected productivity, so is di erence between equilibrium wage and low productivity relative to expected productivity and low productivity. In turn, the gains from an informed
decision which results in rejecting a low productivity are larger in equilibrium than in the social
calculus. In consequence, the rm will overinvest in information. The argument is exactly reversed
if the information is likely to be positive. Then the relative gains of the rm are lower than the
social gains and he underinvests in information. In Taylor (2004), the information is acquired after
the terms of trade are determined and thus the price does not reveal any information about the
productivity of the worker. Yet, the productivity of the worker is identical across all rms. Hence
this is a model of interdependent values, and the equilibrium incentives to acquire information have
comparable e ciency properties as in Bergemann and V•alim•aki (2002).

5

Robustness and Type Spaces

In the rst part of the survey, we emphasized the role of endogenous information for the design
and the performance of mechanisms. In the second part of the survey, we report when and how
mechanisms can achieve their objective even if the planner has little information about the agents'
beliefs about each other. As we have seen in the second motivating example, acquiring information
about other bidders gives naturally rise to type spaces where the players own payo s do not give
su cient descriptions of the strategic environment, but one must account for higher order beliefs
as well. The main task here is to identify which properties of the mechanism guarantee that the
mechanism is robust to strategic uncertainty and hence large types.
The discussion of robustness is an old theme in the mechanism design literature. Hurwicz
(1972) discussed the need for "nonparametric" mechanisms (independent of parameters of the
model). Wilson (1985) states that a desirable property of a trading rule is that it \does not rely on
features of the agents' common knowledge, such as their probability assessments." Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000) \seek auction rules that are independent of the details - such as functional forms
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or distribution of signals - of any particular application and that work well in a broad range of
circumstances".

5.1

Wilson Doctrine
\Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trading rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is de cient to the extent
it assumes other features to be common knowledge, such as one player's probability
assessment about another's preferences or information.
I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on successive reductions in the base
of common knowledge required to conduct useful analyses of practical problems. Only
by repeated weakening of common knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate
reality." Robert Wilson (1987)

Our starting point is the in uential formulation of robustness due to Robert Wilson. Wilson
emphasized that academic mechanism designers were tempted to assume too much common knowledge information among the players, and suggested that more robust conclusions would arise as
researchers were able to relax those common knowledge assumptions. He suggested that the problem is that we make too many implicit common knowledge assumptions in our description of the
planner's problem.6 The modelling strategy must be to rst make explicit the implicit common
knowledge assumptions, and then weaken them. The approach to modelling incomplete information
introduced by Harsanyi (1967-68) and formalized by Mertens and Zamir (1985) is ideally suited to
this task. Harsanyi argued that by allowing an agent's type to include his beliefs about the strategic environment, his beliefs about other agents' beliefs, and so on, any environment of incomplete
information could be captured by a type space. With this su ciently large type space (including all
possible beliefs and higher order beliefs), it is true (tautologically) that there is common knowledge
among the agents of each agent's set of possible types and each type's beliefs over the types of
other agents.
However, as a practical matter, applied economic analysis tends to assume much smaller type
spaces than the universal type space, and yet maintain the assumption that there is common knowledge among the agents of each agent's type space and each type's beliefs over the types of other
6

An important paper of Neeman (2004) shows how rich type spaces can be used to relax implicit common knowledge

assumptions in a mechanism design context. For other approaches to formalizing robust mechanism design, see Chung
and Ely (2003), Duggan and Roberts (1997), Eliaz (2002), Hagerty and Rogerson (1987), Lopomo (1998), Lopomo
(2000).
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agents.
We shall see shortly that the small type space assumption imposes very substantive restrictions.
There has been remarkably little work since Harsanyi checking whether analysis of incomplete
information games in economics is robust to the implicit common knowledge assumptions built
into small type spaces. Yet towards the end of Section 6 we will discuss some recent contributions
which investigate the importance of these implicit common knowledge assumptions in the context
of mechanism design.

5.2

Type Spaces

While holding xed the payo environment, we can construct many type spaces, where an agent's
type speci es both his payo type and his belief about other agents' types. Crucially, there may
be many types of an agent with the same payo type. The larger the type space, the harder it will
be to implement the social choice objective, and so the more \robust" the resulting mechanism will
be. The smallest type space is the \payo type space," where the possible types of each agent are
equal to the set of payo types and common knowledge prior over this type space is assumed. This
is the canonical type space in the mechanism design literature. The largest type space is the union
of all possible type spaces that could have arisen from the payo environment. This is in many
circumstances equivalent to working with a \universal type space," in the sense of Mertens and
Zamir (1985).7 There are many type spaces in between the payo type space and the universal type
space that are also of interest. While maintaining that the above payo environment is common
knowledge, we would like to allow for agents to have all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs
about their types. A exible framework for modelling such beliefs and higher order beliefs are \type
spaces". A type space is a collection
T = Ti ; bi ; bi

I
i=1

:

Agent i's type is ti 2 Ti . A type of agent i must include a description of his payo type. Thus

there is a function

bi : Ti !

(

i) ,

with bi (ti ) being the probability distribution of agent i's payo

particular, agent i might be uncertain about his own payo
7

type when his type is ti . In

type. A type of agent i must also

Yet, Bergemann and Morris (2001) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) emphasize that type spaces may allow

for more correlation than is captured in the belief hierarchies of types as in Mertens and Zamir (1985). More precisely,
identifying types that have identical hierarchies may lead to a loss of information. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris
(2005) and Ely and Peski (2004) propose interim rationalizability as a solution concept under which all type spaces
that have the same hierarchies of beliefs also have the same interim rationalizable outcomes.
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include a description of his beliefs about the types of the other agents. Write

(Z) for the space

of probability measures on the Borel eld of a measurable space Z. The belief of type ti of agent i
is a function
b i : Ti !

(T i ) ,

with bi [ti ] being agent i's beliefs when his type is ti . Thus bi (E) [ti ] is the probability that type

ti of agent i assigns to other agents' types, t i , being an element of a measurable set E

T i . In

the special case where each Tj is nite, we will abuse notation slightly by writing bi (t i ) [ti ] for
the probability that type ti of agent i assigns to other agents having types t i .
A type space T is a payo type space if each Ti = i and each bi is the identity map. Type

space T is nite if each Ti is nite. Finite type space T has full support if bi (ti ) [t i ] > 0 for all
i and t. Finite type space T satis es the common prior assumption (with prior p) if there exists
p2

(T ) such that

t

X
i 2T

p (ti ; t i ) > 0 for all i and ti ;
i

and
bi (t i ) [ti ] =

p (ti ; t i )
P
p ti ; t 0

t0 i 2T

.
i

i

The standard approach in the mechanism design literature is to restrict attention to a common
prior payo

type space (perhaps with full support). Thus it is assumed that there is common

knowledge among the agents of a common prior over the payo types. A payo type space can be
thought of the smallest type space embedding the payo environment described above.
Fix a payo environment and a type space T . A mechanism speci es a message set for each agent

and a mapping from message pro les to outcomes. Social choice function f is interim implementable

if there exists a mechanism and an interim (or Bayesian) equilibrium of that mechanism such that
outcomes are consistent with f . A direct mechanism is a function f : T ! Y .
De nition 3 A direct mechanism f : T ! Y is interim incentive compatible on type space T if
Z
Z
ui f (ti ; t i ) ; b (ti ; t i ) dbi (ti )
ui f t0i ; t i ; b (ti ; t i ) dbi (ti )
t

i 2T i

t

i 2T i

for all i, t 2 T and t0i 2 Ti .

The notion of interim incentive compatibility is often referred to as Bayesian incentive compatibility. We use the former terminology as there need not be a common prior on the type space.
It should be emphasized that a direct mechanism f can prescribe varying allocations for a given
payo pro le as di erent types, t and t0 , may have an identical payo pro le = b (t) = b (t0 ).
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Robust Mechanism Design

In the face of a planner who does not know about agents' beliefs about others' payo

types, a

recent literature has looked at mechanisms that implement the social choice correspondence in ex
post equilibrium. Bergemann and Morris (2004) consider a situation where each player has one of a
set of possible "payo types" and the social planner wants to implement a social choice correspondence mapping payo type pro les to sets of acceptable outcomes. They are interested in partial
implementation - i.e., whether the truthtelling equilibrium in the direct mechanism consistent with
the social choice correspondence? The usual approach to this question would be to assume a commonly known common prior on the payo types, so that - using the solution concept of Bayesian
equilibrium - partial implementability is equivalent to Bayesian incentive compatibility in the direct
mechanism. Instead they ask when it is possible to implement the social choice correspondence
in equilibrium, whatever the players' beliefs and higher order beliefs about other players' types.
Ex post incentive compatibility is su cient for this, but is it necessary? They provide a partial
characterization for the environments where ex post incentive compatibility is equivalent to being
able to implement in equilibrium independent of higher order beliefs. It is true in the economically
signi cant cases of quasi-linear environments (without budget balance constraints) and social choice
functions (i.e., when the correspondence is single valued). These result provide microfoundations
for using a stronger solution concept to address robustness issues. To the extent that ex post direct
mechanisms - when they exist are simpler than Bayesian direct mechanisms for arbitrary common
knowledge common priors, the results also favor simpler mechanisms.
Bergemann and Morris (2004) show that the converse result is not always true. They present
examples in which ex post implementation is impossible, nonetheless, interim implementation is
possible on every type space. The gap arises because the planner may have the equilibrium outcome
depend on the agents' higher order belief types, as well as their realized payo type. The planner
has no intrinsic interest in conditioning on non-payo -relevant aspects of agents' types, but he is
able to introduce slack in incentive constraints by doing so.
The main question in Bergemann and Morris (2004) is then to ask when the converse is true.
A payo environment is separable if the outcome space has a common component and a private
value component for each agent. Each agent cares only about the common component and his own
private component. The social choice correspondence picks a unique element from the common
component and has a product structure over all components. In separable environments, interim
implementation on all common prior payo type spaces implies ex post implementation. Whenever
the social choice correspondence is a function, the environment has a separable representation (since
we can make private value components degenerate). The other leading example of a separable
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environment is the problem of choosing an allocation when arbitrary transfers are allowed and
agents have quasi-linear utility. If the allocation choice is a function but the planner does not care
about the level and distribution of transfers, then we have a separable environment.
This result provides a strong foundation for using ex post equilibrium as a solution concept
in separable environments. Since ex post implementation implies interim implementation on all
type spaces (with or without the common prior or the payo

type restrictions), it also shows

the equivalence between ex post implementation and interim implementation on all type spaces.
To the extent that the mechanisms required for ex post implementation are simpler than the
mechanisms required for Bayesian implementation, these results contribute to the literature on
detail free implementation and the "Wilson doctrine".
For separable environments, the restriction to payo type spaces is not important. But interestingly, outside of separable environment, the restriction matter. Bergemann and Morris (2004)
report a simple example of two agent quasi-linear environment where the balanced budget requirement holds: transfers must add up to zero. In this example, ex post implementation and interim
implementation on all type spaces are both impossible, but interim implementation on all payo
type spaces is possible. The quasi-linear environments with budget balance is a leading example
of an economic non-separable environment. With two agents, there is an equivalence between ex
post implementation and interim implementation on all type spaces. With at most two payo
types for each agent, there is the stronger equivalence between ex post implementation and interim
implementation on all payo type spaces. But with three or more agents with three or more types,
equivalence between ex post implementation and interim implementation on all type spaces breaks
down.
An important paper of Neeman (2004) shows how rich type spaces can be used to relax implicit
common knowledge assumptions in a mechanism design context. For other approaches to formalizing robust mechanism design, see Chung and Ely (2003), Duggan and Roberts (1997), Eliaz (2002),
Hagerty and Rogerson (1987), and Lopomo (1998), (2000).
Chung and Ely (2004) consider optimal auction with private values in large type spaces. They
show that a dominant strategy mechanism may achieve a higher payo than any Bayesian equilibrium mechanism provided that the type space is large. The intuition is that for any given
mechanism, there may exist a type space which exposes weaknesses in the incentive constraints
and leads to an inferior expected revenue result in comparison to a dominant strategy mechanism
in which the agent are only asked to report their payo type, but not to report any belief type.
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Robust Implementation

Bayesian incentive compatibility analysis su ers from two important limitations. First, as discussed,
the analysis typically assumes a commonly known common prior over the agents' types. This
assumption may be too stringent in practise. Second, the revelation principle only establishes that
the direct mechanism has an equilibrium that achieves the social choice function. In general, there
may be other equilibria that deliver undesirable outcomes. In the spirit of the "Wilson doctrine"
(Wilson (1987)), it is then natural to look for implementation results that are robust to di erent
assumptions about what players do or do not know about other agents' types. While the possibility
of multiple equilibria does seem to be a relevant one in practical mechanism design problems,
particularly in the form of collusion and shill bidding, the theoretical literature is not seen as
having developed practical insights (with a few recent exceptions such as Ausubel and Milgrom
(2005) and Yokoo, Sakurai, and Matsubara (2004)).
In light of the earlier results on robust incentive compatibility, it is natural to ask whether
implementation in Bayesian equilibrium for all possible higher order beliefs is equivalent to ex
post implementation in the payo

type space. Bergemann and Morris (2005a) investigate the

conditions required for ex post implementation i.e. they ask whether it is the case that all ex post
equilibria deliver outcomes in the social choice correspondence. The task for the designer, who
does not know the agents' types, is to choose a mechanism such that in every equilibrium of the
mechanism, agents' play of the game results in the outcome speci ed by the social choice objective at
every type pro le. This problem has been analyzed under the assumption of complete information
(see Maskin (1999)) and under the assumption of incomplete information (see Postlewaite and
Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991)).
Because an ex post equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium at every type pro le, there is a natural
relationship between ex post and Nash implementation. In the comparison between the complete
with the incomplete information settings, two important di erences regarding the ability of the
agents to sustain equilibrium behavior emerges. On the one hand, with complete information,
the agents have the ability to coordinate their actions at every preference pro le. This makes the
designer's problem harder. On the other hand, with complete information the designer can detect
individual deviations from the reports of the other agents. This makes the designer's problem
easier. The ability of the agents to coordinate in complete information settings makes the task of
implementing the social choice outcome more di cult for the designer, but it is made easier by the
lack of individual incentive constraints. With incomplete information, the rst problem becomes
easier, but the second becomes harder. As these two e ects are in con ict, they show that ex
post and Maskin monotonicity are not nested notions. In particular, either one of them can hold
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while the other one can fail. Interestingly, in the class of single crossing environments, ex post
monotonicity is always guaranteed as is Maskin monotonicity. Even though ex post monotonicity
has to include ex post incentive constraints absent in the complete information world, it turns
out that the local property of single crossing indi erence curves is su cient to guarantee ex post
monotonicity in the presence of strict rather than weak ex post incentive constraints.
The \augmented" mechanisms used to obtain ex post implementation results inherit some
complex and unsatisfactory features from their complete information and Bayesian counterparts.
Yet they also identify a number of important settings where ex post implementation is only possible
when it is possible in the direct mechanism. This is true, for example, if the social choice function
has a su ciently wide range or if the environment is supermodular. In particular, they show that
the direct mechanism has a unique ex post equilibrium in the problem of e ciently allocating goods
when bidders have interdependent values (see Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Perry and Reny
(2002)).
The complete information implementation literature makes the assumption of common knowledge of preferences, the Bayesian implementation literature makes the assumption that there is
common knowledge of a prior on a xed set of types; this both seems unlikely to practical market
designers and is a substantive constraint when viewed as a restriction on all possible beliefs and
higher order beliefs. Yet in general, robust implementation is a more stringent requirement than ex
post implementation. Bergemann and Morris (2005b) analyze the problem of Bayesian implementation under the assumption that the designer has no information on the players' types. While the
incentive compatibility constraints for this problem are the same as for the ex post implementation
problem,8 the resulting "robust monotonicity" condition (equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on
all type spaces) is strictly stronger then ex post monotonicity (and Maskin monotonicity). The
resulting robust monotonicity notions provide the full implementation counterparts to the robust
mechanism design (i.e. partial implementation) questions discussed earlier. In particular, they
show that interim implementation on all type spaces is possible if and only if it is possible to
implement the social choice function using an iterative deletion procedure. The observation about
iterative deletion illustrates a general point well-known from the literature on epistemic foundations of game theory (e.g., Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b)):
equilibrium solution concepts only have bite if we make strong assumptions about type spaces, i.e.,
we assume small type spaces where the common prior assumption holds.
By exploiting the equivalence between robust and iterative implementation they obtain necessary and su cient conditions for robust implementation in general environments. The necessity
8

This follows from results in Bergemann and Morris (2004).
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argument is conceptually novel, exploiting the iterative characterization. The necessary conditions
for robust implementation are ex post incentive compatibility of the social choice function and a
condition - robust monotonicity - that is equivalent to requiring interim monotonicity on every type
space. The robust monotonicity condition is very strong and implies both Maskin monotonicity and
ex post monotonicity conditions (but is strictly weaker than dominant strategies). As an added
bene t, the robust implementation analysis removes the frequent gap between pure and mixed
strategy implementation in the literature.
The iterative characterization comes with the additional bene t that tight implementation results can be proved via a

xed point of a contraction mapping. In particular, they consider a

general class of interdependent preferences in which the payo types of the agents can be linearly
aggregated. In this environment they show that the social choice function can be robustly implemented if and only if the interdependence is not too large. If

is the weight of the type of

agent j (relative to the type of agent i) for the utility of agent i, then the robust implementation
condition can simply be stated as:
they also show that if

> 1= (I

< 1= (I

1), where I is the number of agents. Surprisingly,

1), then not only robust implementation, but even robust virtual

implementation fails.
An important paper of Chung and Ely (2001) analyzes the single (and multi-unit) auction with
interdependent valuations with dominance solvability (elimination of weakly rather than strictly
dominated actions). In a linear and symmetric setting, they reported su cient conditions for direct implementation that coincide with the ones derived in Bergemann and Morris (2005b). In the
environment with linear aggregation, under strict incentive compatibility, the basic insight extends
from the single unit auction model to general allocations models, with elimination of strictly dominated actions only (thus Chung and Ely (2001) require deletion of weakly dominated strategies
only because incentive constraints are weak). By comparing the conditions for ex post and robust
implementation, it becomes apparent that robust implementation typically imposes additional constraints on the allocation problem. In Bergemann and Morris (2005a) it is shown that in single
crossing environments, the same single crossing conditions which guarantee incentive compatibility
also guarantee full implementation. In contrast, in the linear aggregation environment, Bergemann
and Morris (2005b) show that robust implementation imposes a strict bound on the interdependence
of the preferences, which is not required by the truthtelling conditions. The contraction mapping
behind the iterative argument directly points at the source of the restriction of the interaction term.
In the implementation literature, it is a standard practice to obtain the su ciency results
with augmented mechanisms. By augmenting the direct mechanism with additional messages, the
designer may elicit additional information about undesirable equilibrium play by the agents. Yet, in
many environments common to applied mechanism designs, such a single crossing or supermodular
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preferences, the structure of the preferences may already permit direct implementation We thus
provide necessary and su cient conditions for robust implementation in the direct mechanism.
In the direct mechanism, the agents can alert the designer only by a report of their type. In
consequence, the incentive compatibility conditions for the rewards are identical to the truth-telling
constraints, and the necessary and su cient conditions for robust implementation coincide.
Chung and Ely (2003) are also concerned with the robustness of implementation result. They
consider complete information implementation and show that recent permissive results in the implementation literature are not robust to the introduction of some incomplete information. More
precisely, they consider the notion of undominated Nash equilibrium and show that even though
almost any social choice function can be implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium under
complete information, the introduction of arbitrarily small incomplete information is enough to
re-establish Maskin monotonicity as a necessary condition for implementation. Kunimoto (2004)
complements the analysis and points out that the result by Chung and Ely (2003) depends critically on the (implicit) topology. He suggests a coarser topology under which undominated Nash
equilibrium is indeed robust to the introduction of complete information.

6.2

Local Robustness

The approach of robustness in the above literature required that a mechanism could be implemented
for all possible types space. This robustness criterion is therefore clearly very demanding and it is
plausible to investigate weaker, in particular, local robustness criteria. In addition, it requires that
the allocation problem could be de ned independent of the beliefs of the designer and the agents.
In contrast, revenue maximizing mechanism, such as optimal pricing and optimal auction, depend
on the beliefs of the designer.
Bergemann and Schlag (2005) investigate a robust version of the classic problem of optimal
monopoly pricing with incomplete information. The robust version of the problem is distinct in
two aspects. First, instead of a given true distribution regarding the valuations of the buyers, in
our set-up the seller only knows that the true distribution is in a neighborhood of a given model
distribution. The enlargement of the set of possible priors represents the model misspeci cation.
Second, the objective function of the seller is formulated as a regret minimization rather than a
revenue maximization problem. The regret is the di erence between the actual valuation of the
buyer for the object and the actual revenue obtained by the seller. The regret of the seller can be
positive for two reasons: (i) the buyer has a low valuation relative to the price and hence does not
purchase the object, or (ii) he has a high valuation relative to the price and hence the seller could
have obtained a higher revenue. For a given neighborhood of possible distributions, they then
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characterize the pricing policy which minimizes maximal regret. They describe how the robust
policies depend on the model distribution and the size of the risk as represented by the size of the
neighborhood. As part of the analysis, they also determine how the regret varies with the amount
of risk faced by the seller.
By pursuing the robust analysis with the notion of regret rather than revenue they combine the
attractive features of the worst case analysis with the those of the robust analysis. In particular,
for any given neighborhood, the seller uses the information contained in the model distribution and
its neighborhood. The seller is minimizing expected regret and thus uses the information contained
in the prior. In addition, at the worst case prior, the pricing policy which minimizes regret also
maximizes revenue. Thus the regret minimization problem has a direct decision theoretic link to
the original objective function of the seller, namely revenue maximization.
The robust policy in the model of Bergemann and Schlag (2005) is the result of a minmax regret
problem. The seller could therefore also be interpreted as an ambiguity averse seller in the sense
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) if we were to maximize revenue rather than minimize regret. A
recent paper by Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape (2004) investigates the nature of the optimal auction
in the presence of an ambiguity averse seller as well as ambiguity averse bidders.
Segal (2003) considers the optimal pricing mechanism with unknown demand. In his model,
the seller does not know the distribution from which the buyers valuation are drawn. However, he
knows that the valuation of each buyer represents a independent draw from the same distribution.
He then suggest an optimal pricing mechanism in which the seller o ers individualized prices. The
price of individual i however only depends on the information he received from all customers but i.
By making the price independent of the report of agent i, the equilibrium strategy of each bidder
is an ex post equilibrium strategy. Similarly, Baliga and Vohra (2003) consider trading models
when buyers and sellers do not know the distribution of valuations. They consider dynamic and
adaptive mechanism with and without intermediaries. They show that as the number of traders
becomes large, the adaptive mechanism achieve the same expected revenues as if the seller were
to know the true distribution of the demand. Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright (2001) consider a
similar problem but in contrast do not even make the i.i.d. assumption about the valuations of the
customers. Without any Bayesian information, they derive the optimal selling mechanism under
the competitive ratio. In other words, they maximize the worst case revenue relative to the optimal
revenue which could be obtained if the seller were to know the true valuations of the buyers. The
worst case analysis and the notion of competitiveness is central in many optimal design problems
analyzed in computer science (see the recent survey to online design problems by Borodin and ElYaniv (1998)). In auction theory, Neeman (2003) analyzes the competitiveness of the second price
auction. A recent article by Prasad (2003) presents negative result, an in particular shows that the
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standard optimal pricing policy of the monopolist is not robust to small model misspeci cations.

6.3

Rationalizability and Implementation

An alternative approach of allowing richer beliefs and strategic uncertainty into standard mechanism
design is to relax the solution concept from equilibrium to rationalizability, an approach pursued
by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003a) and Dekel and Wolinsky (2003). Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(2003a) consider the standard private value auction with a continuum of valuations and bids.
They show that any positive bid up to some level above the Nash equilibrium is rationalizable.
In contrast, Dekel and Wolinsky (2003) consider a set-up with a nite number of valuations and
bids, but allow for some degree of a liation. They show that as the number of bidders increases,
the set of rationalizable bids converges to the bid closest to the true valuation. Similarly Cho
(2005) considers the rst price auction in a model with a liated values, and analyzes rationalizable
strategies after imposing the additional restriction that all feasible bidding strategies have to be
monotone. He shows that the winning bid in the set of rationalizable bidding strategies converges
to the competitive equilibrium price as the number of bidder increases. Cho (2004) extends the
rationalizability analysis to large uniform and double price auctions.

6.4

Large Types and Strategic Uncertainty

Fang and Morris (2005) illustrate the role of large type spaces for the revenue equivalence theorem.
They analyze a model of independent private values with two bidders. However each bidder receives
a two-dimensional signal, the rst element is his private valuation (the valuation type) and the
second element is a noisy signal about the valuation of his competitor (the information type).
The addition of the second signal enriches the strategic information of each bidder but obviously
reduces common knowledge among bidders and auctioneer. In this simple setting, they compare
rst and second price auctions and conclude that the revenue equivalence theorem fails and that
no de nite revenue ranking exists with multidimensional signals, even though the setting remains
a private value model. Naturally, the additional strategic information does not change the bidding
strategy in the second price auction, but a ects the bidding strategy in the rst price auction. The
additional information can have two distinct e ects on the bidding strategy. Suppose that bidder 1
receives a signal that bidder 2 is likely to have a similar valuation. Relative to his bidding strategy
without the strategic information, he now has essentially two choices. He can either increase his
bid to improve his chances of winning, or he can lower his bid, and focus on winning against lower
valuation type of his opponent. The optimal response to the strategic information will depend on
the informativeness of signal and may go either way. In consequence, bidding may become more
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erce or more subdued, leaving the revenue ranking open to go in either direction. The multidimensional private value model is closely related to the a liated value model of Wilson (1977)
and Milgrom and Weber (1982). Yet, in Fang and Morris (2005), the belief of bidder 1 about bidder
2 depends directly on the value type of bidder 2 rather than the value type of bidder 1 as in the
a liated value model.
Kim and Che (2004) analyze the role of strategic information in a similar setting. In an independent private value setting with I bidders, a subset of bidder exactly observe the valuation among
of each agent in its subset but no additional information about the agents in the complementary
set. They also nd that the revenue equivalence theorem fails and establish that a second price
auction generates a higher expected value than the rst price auction. Andreoni, Che, and Kim
(2005) pursue an experimental study of this set-up and largely con rm the theoretical predictions.
Ye (2004) considers an auction with entry. Each bidder has to incur a cost before learning his own
valuation. Yet, in contrast to earlier work, each bidder will also receive some noisy information
about the value of the competing bidders. If the information potentially available to the bidders
after entry is su ciently rich, then he shows that the Vickrey auction is the only optimal sealed
bid auction.
Arya, Demski, and Glover (2003) consider an optimal auction environment with two bidders.
The private information of each bidder consists of two elements, his own private valuation, and
an improved estimate (relative to the prior and the posterior on the basis of his valuation alone)
about the value of the competing bidders. The seller can design an optimal auction, but is a
priori restricted to use as information only his prior and the report of each bidder about his own
valuation. The seller is not allowed to use the additional information that bidder i has about the
likelihood of valuations of bidder j. Otherwise, the environment is such that it would allow for
full surplus extraction with dominant strategies as in Cremer and McLean (1988). They show that
if the informational asymmetry regarding the distribution of values is small, then the full surplus
extraction results still holds, but the strategies only form a Bayesian rather than a dominant
strategy equilibrium. On the other hand, if the informational asymmetry is large, then full surplus
extraction fails to hold, and a simple modi ed second-price auction is optimal.
Feinberg and Skrypacz (2005) pursue the logic of multidimensional types, in particular the
separation between payo
information.

types and belief types in the context of bargaining under incomplete
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Conclusion

In this survey we emphasized the role of information for mechanism design. First, we discussed
an emerging literature on the role of endogenous information for the design and the e ciency of
the relevant mechanism. Second, we argued that in the presence of endogenous information, the
robustness of the mechanism of the type space becomes a natural desideratum. We then discussed
some recent approaches to robust mechanism design and implementation.
During our discussion of the recent contributions, we have indicated that many questions remain
wide open, and in fact the current research poses and creates many new questions. We end this
survey by collecting a few of them.
As we consider the role of information acquisition, it is natural to consider dynamic and in
particular mechanism in which information is acquired sequentially. Recent work by Compte and
Jehiel (2000) showed that the ascending price auction improves upon the static second price auction
by allowing for contingent information acquisition. Yet in the ascending price auction information
arrives in a particular way, the estimate about the expected value of the competing bid is increasing
over time. It is then natural whether a descending price auction might sometimes more favorable
for information acquisition then an ascending price auction. The advantage of a descending price
auction is that the possible bidder receives over time information that it is bid is more likely to
be competitive as the competition apparently do not have very high valuation, or else they would
already have stopped the clock. Interestingly, Klemperer (2002) suggest a sequential combination
of English and Dutch auction to enhance entry and deter collusion. Yet a combination of English
and Dutch auction could also be optimal to generate information and hence competition among
the bidders.
We saw that the ex post e cient mechanisms may lead to excessive information acquisition
in typical auction settings. We can then ask how we would have to modify the ex post e cient
mechanism to achieve a second best solution. There are two natural modi cation of the ex post
e cient allocation. The slope of the probability that an agent gets the object could be reduced
until information acquisition in equilibrium coincides with the social equilibrium. With a completely randomized decision to allocate the object, the agent will not have any incentives to acquire
information. Thus if we change the probability from e cient to completely ine cient we eventually we correct the incentives to acquire information. For the given interim probability, we can
then identify allocation which leads to the lowest losses in e ciency. Presumably, the solution will
involve a large distortion to the allocation at the low end of the valuations as this will have the
largest overall e ect on transfers and incentives as they will in uence all payments for the higher
allocations.
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The classic auctions such as auctions for art and wine, rely on a synchronization of demand
and supply at a particular time and date. This has bene ts for the aggregation of information and
the informational e ciency of the auction. With the increased adoption of auction or auction like
formats in electronic commerce, the synchronization aspect typically disappears and the arrival of
supply and demand becomes decentralized and uncertain. This poses entirely new questions as to
how auctions should be organized, in particular when and how long markets should be open and
closed. This issue appeared at the forefront of auction theory perhaps rst in the design of activity
rules for the FCC auction. But in a sense, it is even more of an issue in electronic markets, where
both the liquidity and the thickness of the market essentially contributes to the attractiveness
of auctions and similar trading rules. Yet, until now, we do not very good insight into dynamic
mechanism design in the presence of asynchronous and decentralized trading, see Gallien (2005)
and Gallien and Gupta (2005) for some recent work in this direction.
In the area of robustness, much of the recent work focused on testing the robustness of a social
choice function or mechanism which can be identi ed independent of the beliefs of the agents and
the designer, the problem of nding an e cient allocation is a classical example. Yet, in many
relevant design problems, the beliefs of the designer and the agents enter into the determination
of the mechanism, the leading example here is seller maximizing revenue from an optimal auction.
Formulating the robust mechanism design problem for this class of problems becomes conceptually
more di cult. In order to maximize revenue, the designer must be endowed with some beliefs over
the agents' types. Yet to formalize a notion of robustness, one ought to consider a set of possible
beliefs.
Bergemann and Morris (2005c) suggest one possible way to proceed by maintaining the assumption that the principal is certain about the true distribution over payo types, but allow the
principal to be uncertain about agents' beliefs and higher order beliefs about other agents' types.
For a given prior distribution over payo types, they try to nd (i) the optimal mechanism for a
given type space, and (ii) the worst case type space which minimizes the revenue of the designer.
Even though the distribution over payo types is kept constant at a given prior, the strategic uncertainty severely limit the designer to extract the surplus. They show that in many instances,
the revenue of the auctioneer can be reduced to the level which could be obtained in the ex post
equilibrium of the game.
We discussed in some detail the role of large type spaces for implementation. If the agents
possess large amounts of private information relative to the designer, then their ability to coordinate
actions ought to increase and hence the equilibrium multiplicity problem may become severe. If
the agents succeed in coordinating their actions on equilibrium play which is undesirable from the
principal's point of view, then the issue of with multiplicity is essential an issue of collusion among
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the agents. It is thus conceivable that a common framework and characterization techniques to
understand robustness, equilibrium multiplicity and collusion in the context of mechanism design
might emerge as one result of this research on large type spaces. The recent work by La ont
and Martimort (1997), (2000) on how collusion a ects the principal in the presence of correlated
information already establishes partial connections.
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